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The WEEKLY REVIEW, issued every Friday morning by the Office of Current Intelligence, reports and analyzes significant developments of the week through noon on Thursday. It frequently includes material coordinated with or prepared by the Office of Economic Research, the Office of Strategic Research, and the Directorate of Science and Technology. Topics requiring more comprehensive treatment and therefore published separately as Special Reports are listed in the contents pages.

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
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
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NO INDICATION OF SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS AT PEKING TALKS


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Although Moscow has asked Peking to accept a new ambassador and may have made some token troop pullbacks from the border, Brezhnev's remarks on 14 April indicate that no substantial progress has been made in the negotiations.




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NO INDICATION OF SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS AT PEKING TALKS

Although a few Soviet and Chinese officials have alleged that there has been "some progress" at the Peking border talks, there is no indication that basic obstacles have been overcome. Moreover, in a major speech on 14 April, Soviet party chief Brezhnev berated the Chinese for creating an atmosphere that in "no way facilitates the success" of the talks.

The claims of "progress" may have been generated by a Soviet request that Peking accept a new ambassador and the possibility that Moscow may have made some token troop pullbacks along the frontier. In late March the Soviets asked Peking for agreement on Vladimir Stepakov as the new Soviet ambassador to Peking. Stepakov, who until recently had been head of the central committee propaganda department, does not have experience in either diplomatic or Chinese affairs.

The Soviets claim that Stepakov's designation is part of a recent

agreement with China to exchange ambassadors and that Peking will reciprocate "a little later." There has been no confirmation of this from Chinese officials, however, and an Eastern European diplomat in Peking said that as of 10 April the Chinese had not agreed to Stepakov's appointment. The Chinese are almost certainly reluctant to help open the way for Kuznetsov's departure from the talks. Nevertheless, they probably will accept the new ambassador in order to demonstrate a positive attitude in the dispute and to keep the crucial border negotiations in session.

There has been no independent confirmation of any Soviet troop

withdrawals along the border but it would be extremely difficult to detect a small, local pullback. The Soviets heretofore have adamantly resisted Chinese suggestions that they reduce their military pressure or withdraw forces from disputed frontier areas. Moreover, a strongly worded Red Star article appearing at about the same time as Chou's reported remarks condemned extensive military construction and other acts of an "openly provocative nature" on the Chinese side of the frontier.

It is possible, however, that Moscow is hopeful that a token gesture of no military significance might induce a concession from Peking. In addition, Moscow could

point to such a move as "proof" of its flexibility in the face of Peking's alleged intransigence.

[REDACTED] the Russians may be trying to foster the notion that they have their problems with China under control during the second round of SALT. In addition, they may be eager to find evidence that their six months of talking with China are producing results. Brezhnev's remarks on 14 April regarding China are the most recent of several signs, however, that no substantial progress in the Peking talks has been made or is likely to be made soon.

[REDACTED]